Fifty or so days ago, when the Ukraine invasion had just begun, I summarized some takes that seemed thoughtful and some that seemed foolish, and wrote down what I hoped we would see play out in policy. I summarized by saying:
The United States is not responsible for the evil perpetrated by the despots in these places; but, having inserted itself to varying degrees in many of these conflicts, it gains a stake in the outcome and some proportional responsibility for the outcome. So two takeaways:
Don't get involved in things you cannot or will not fully commit to, or otherwise don't want to accept blame for.
Recognize that whatever is going to happen to Ukraine is barely a blip in the amount of misery happening on this planet that most people spend their day willfully ignoring, and act appropriately.
Noah Smith is still fully on side of maximal support for Ukraine doing whatever it thinks is in its best interest, and suggests that America should do whatever it can to support that by giving the country weapons and other aid. Apparently socialism is "totally broken" because Noam Chomsky suggested some potential offramps and the need for concessions in an interview. Smith has had a very good past 50 days because Ukraine really pulled it together and shocked its critics by staging a relatively successful defense. If anything, Russia's invasion has been a nation building operation that is creating a founding myth of liberation for Ukraine to the extent one didn't already exist for many of its people. I greatly underestimated Ukraine, and I'm having my helping of humble pie, but I don't think it means yielding the field to people like Smith who think we need to lean into Russia's strategic stumble.
Luckily, Smith isn't running the show. Despite all of the outpouring of moral support, the United States' policy seems pretty conservative and in line with what I think makes sense -- for now.
- There is reluctance to escalate involvement along certain vectors. Anti-tank weapons seem to be ok (aside: the switchblade drones are really badass), while "boots on the ground" or fighter jets are either an outright no or unlikely
- Americans seem ready to welcome a sizable number of Ukrainian refugees, and we should try to take more than whatever number is currently on the table (wherever we land still won't be enough)
- There's a lot of talk about brain draining Russia. Again, we won't do enough to encourage Russian talent to come here, but it's the right approach
- I'm not super excited about Sweden and Finland joining NATO if it happens, but also can't exactly blame them for asking or NATO for accepting
- I'm not hearing a whole lot about a fast track to Ukraine EU accession, and am hopeful that whatever favorable track they get put on still has very real milestones for good governance and civil liberty that need to be hit
- Looks like we are going to get a (even more) swollen defense budget. Apparently when Russia proves to be weak, we need to spend more. Can you imagine what the takeaway would be if Russia kicked ass? In any event, it's incremental growth but hardly a massive rearmament
All this makes me wonder if there is something clarifying by the nuclear stakes that improves decision making. When the costs are so asymmetrical like in the War on Terror, we seem to have made some huge blunders. Here, Russia's nuclear arsenal gives us enough existential dread to measure twice and cut once. If there's something to this, how can we design systems such that we impose costs on ourselves for bad decision-making even when our enemies cannot?
And exactly why has Ukraine been so successful? Is there something to generalize from there? It seems to come down to "is Ukraine special?"
- Cynical theory: You can send top notch kit to an ally and as long as they have manpower and grit, they can fight a war to a stalemate or at least prolong defeat. Nothing super special about Ukraine itself, and this outcome is not contingent.
- Idealistic theory: Ukraine was underestimated as its own nation, and its people have been galvanized by war. The strategic situation there is mostly the result of their determination to die for their country, while Russia suffers from ineptitude, lack of troop morale, and incorrect assumptions about its enemy's resolve. Something very special about Ukraine, and contingent.
- Synthesis: Ukraine has greatly benefited from being armed and trained by the West, and will continue to benefit from receiving aid, but clearly has a nationalist secret sauce that Afghanistan didn't and is deploying those advantages successfully. We need to revisit the facts and circumstances when this conflict reaches some sort of resolution and consider what lessons can be learned.